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The words “Social Credit System” have been ghosting through Western me-
dia ever since the Chinese government published its planning outline for 
establishing the system’s framework in the short time between 2014 and 
2020. Journalists and academics all over the world have begun the hunt for 
not only the few known facts about this ephemeral big-data project but more 
importantly all it’s possible, most disquieting applications. Meanwhile in 
China very little is being said about the SCS and the “Westerner’s hysterics” 
are being remarked upon with the pragmatism only a people already very 
much under a lifelong constant surveillance by their state can manage.
What is the 
Social Credit System?
The social credit system (Chin.: 社会信用体系) is 
first and foremost a system that is meant to 
monitor, rate and manage how people, compa-
nies, organizations or institutions behave. It is 
not one number which measures one’s worth, 
but a complex conglomeration of data collection 
and rating systems managed mostly by govern-
ment agents aided and abetted by private com-
panies. Behind the bureaucratic screen a black 
box of algorithms enforces the Chinese govern-
ment plans to “allow the trustworthy to roam 
everywhere under heaven while making it hard 
for the discredited to take a single step”.
Beyond that definition, the shape the Social 
Credit System will take is speculation, as it is a 
multi-stage as well as multiple decade project. 
More than three dozen pilot cities are in the pro-
cess of implementing forms of social credit score 
monitoring. The extent to which behavior is rated 
varies as well as the incentive and punitive mea-
sures throughout the pilot systems. News about 
a student not gaining entrance to a university 
due to their father being on a credit blacklist and 
somebody in the admission office showing their 
enthusiastic support beyond the actual scope of 
the Social Credit Score is one of the extreme 
cases that caused insecurity about the future of 
the SCS. Its equation with customer loyalty 
schemes and credit rating systems like the “Ses-
ame Score” (芝麻Credit: a reward system imple-
mented by Ant Financial Services Group, an Ali-
baba Group affiliate company), that incorporated 
moral aspects to online consumeristic behavior 
and shared the data it collected about its custom-
ers through publicized scores, added fuel to the 
speculation of “Orwellian” apocalyptic scenarios 
being spread around by Western media.
It is at this moment in time indubitably easier to 
say what the SCS is not, or at least not yet 
planned to be should it be implemented starting 
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2020. Basing the definition of the Credit system 
on the Chinese government’s planning outline, 
the new system is to ensure trustworthy behavior 
on all levels: the governmental, the judiciary, the 
social as well as the economic sphere. Concern-
ing the focus area of the Social credit score sys-
tem, the amount of information provided in the 
planning outline is highest on the topic of econ-
omy, while the least amount of information is 
given in the field of the improvement the system 
should bring to government work.
Origins
The idea of a “Social Credit System” is neither 
new, nor is it particularly surprising in its ap-
pearance in China or Western regions.
In Germany we know of the impact our Schufa 
report has on our chances when looking for an 
apartment. However, the degree to which China 
aspires to integrate such scoring systems into 
every aspect of life in China is unique. The 
Schufa only monitors easily quantifiable data: 
your credit card history, payment infractions as 
well as the length of credit history to assist mon-
eylenders and landlords in sizing up the risk of 
getting involved with a person. Schufa is also 
only one factor of our credit rating (Bonitätsprü-
fung); in Germany other factors could be one’s 
marital status, number of children, job, the sec-
tor you work in… etc. China has not had such a 
unified credit rating system so far which made 
it difficult to borrow money, invest safely or ac-
quire real estate for many people. Now, imagine 
a Schufa report having an impact on whether or 
not you can buy a flight ticket for the next holi-
day thereby curtailing your right of free move-
ment and one will grasp the extended impact 
the Chinese credit rating system will have on 
one’s life. However, one component which is re-
peatedly highlighted in the Chinese Social 
Credit System is clearly missing in Western ver-
sions: the moral education factor.
“Trustworthiness, is the base on which the gov-
ernment builds the project ideologically.” So, 
states the planning outline. Answering the de-
mand of its people to deal with the uncertainty 
and distrust that companies created in 2008 
with the toxic baby milk scandal or the Red 
Cross mismanagement scandal of Guo Meimei.
The Chinese government has always had a key 
role in the moral education of its people. As 
such the paternalistic, educational and behavior 
modulating aspect of the SCS is not as outland-
ish to Chinese as it appears to Westerners so the 
opinion of many China researchers.
Self-policing has a long-standing tradition in 
China. The Communist party continued the ef-
forts of social control that even the emperors of 
China’s past tried to extend since it came into 
power in 1949. Self-policing can be found in 
China as far back as the Song dynasty when the 
ruler monitored and influenced people’s be-
havior by making groups of households keep an 
eye on each other in a systematic manner. Ideol-
ogy plays a central role in the ruling party’s le-
gitimation and resonates heavily in the planning 
outline for the Social Credit System, it must be 
deeply ingrained into people as there is not 
enough man power otherwise to ensure com-
pliance. The rise of mandatory ideological edu-
cation at universities, the billboards teaching 
the value of correct Chinese behavior, the public 
idealization of moral as well as the shaming of 
immoral citizens, are all tools used to cement 
the top-down ideology which is needed for the 
legitimization of the Social Credit System. The 
advanced digital means of our time simply offer 
a new scope of control, using them has been 
part of Jiang Zemin’s plans, who already asked 
for: “the (…) automation, of economic and social 
management” (Samantha Hoffman, 12/2017) in 
1995; as well as Hu Jintao and Zhou Youkang 
who tried to establish a “Modern Grid Policing” 
project in Shanghai in 2000. Therefore, Xi Jin-
ping’s government does not steer to far from the 
path Chinese rulers have taken in the past.
The Communist party is linking technology and 
governance based on harvesting data about 
people, organizations and companies to inform 
decision making and now to create a standard-
ized system of incentives and punishments to 
influence behavior as well.
Economic goals to be achieved 
by the SCS
Rectifying and regulating the order of the market 
economy, improving the market’s credit environ-
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ment, reducing transaction costs, preventing 
economic risk, reducing administrative govern-
mental interference, improving the Socialist mar-
ket economy as a whole by fighting monopolies 
and enforcing sensible pricing, all those are 
goals which the Social Credit System should 
achieve in the name of the Chinese government. 
Thereby building a self-enforcing mechanism for 
already existing and future market regulations as 
well as steering market participants towards in-
dustrial and technological targets and strengthen 
transparency as well as trustworthiness.
Various ministries and private companies which 
so far have been gathering data for example for 
the small and micro enterprise credit system or 
the rural credit information are now being 
pushed for more comprehensive supervision of 
their subjects and more importantly data shar-
ing via interdepartmental platforms. This will be 
managed under the guidance of the “Regula-
tions on Administration of the Credit Investiga-
tion Sector” and promulgated by the State 
Council.
The use of credit ratings is thereby expanded 
beyond the financial and product quality as-
pects. For example, should a company not com-
ply with labor rights or commit environmental 
pollution their social credit ranking could be 
lowered automatically enforced by real-time 
monitoring systems. This would lead to them 
being blacklisted for government contracts, it 
could also induce higher taxation, unfavorable 
loan conditions or other punitive measures. 
Many voices see this as a one of the most favora-
ble aspects of the Social Credit System. Keeping 
in mind that the rules and regulations enforced 
are those of the Chinese government, aligned 
with its rhetoric and goals one might be cau-
tious in this assessment.
China’s Civil Aviation Authority made front-
pages at the beginning of 2017 by sending out 
44 letters to airline companies (among which 
foreign companies were included) insisting on 
the PRC’s exact wording and categorization of 
Taiwan as a Chinese self-ruled island. Failure to 
adhere to the Chinese rhetoric would lead to a 
lowering of the company’s credit rating and the 
possible punitive measures including public 
blacklisting, rising amount of inspections and 
difficulties with Chinese banks.
Such forceful integration amounts to IT-backed 
authoritarianism as well as speculation on 
whether this system might lead to a “Planned 
economy 2.0”. The SCS might force companies 
to comply with producing a quota of electronic 
cars for example to avoid punitive measures 
and adhere to the government’s plans to reach 
China’s environmental goals, however if there 
is no demand on the market we might see a 
massive misallocation of resources. On the 
other hand, the SCS could channel invest-
ments into cutting-edge technology sectors 
and steer companies into behaving in ways 
which solve social and environmental prob-
lems.
Whether the impact of the Social Credit System 
on the economic sector is positive or negative 
depends on the comprehensiveness of the data 
available and the complexities of the algorithms 
interpreting that data correctly. Calling the en-
deavor ambitious is putting it mildly.
Social goals 
to be achieved by the SCS
According to the government’s planning outline 
social contradictions are prominent in Chinese 
society and the Social Credit Score should assist 
in perpetuating harmony. The planning outline 
does not elaborate what exactly those contra-
dictions are. We can assume, that the source of 
some of the problems the Chinese government 
sees are due to the growing inclusion of China 
in the global community, which opens its civil 
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society and citizens to Western ideas of govern-
ance and other un-Chinese concepts. According 
to the Chinese government, the lack of a com-
prehensive, coordinated and all-encompassing 
credit system poses a threat to the economic 
and social development of the Chinese state, as 
people do not trust each other, national compa-
nies or state actors.
How do you engender trust and bend public 
behavior in a society which is not allowed open 
public debate or electoral feedback without 
putting a police guard on every single person? 
You can’t; therefore, you put a cyber guard on 
them that tracks and judges every activity, and 
punishes or rewards you consequently.
According to the government, the goal is to 
make honesty and trustworthiness the entire 
populations’ conscientious behavioral norm.
Rongcheng, in Shandong province is one of the 
pilot hubs for the Social Credit System. Every 
citizen received an amount of 1000 credit points 
to raise or lose. People’s credit scores provide 
them a rating from A+++ to D. A scoring al-
ready used in companies and social organiza-
tions all over China. Applied to citizens it might 
mean that being caught drunk driving lowers 
you to a C, taking in your bedridden mother in 
law and caring for her raises a person to an A. 
The resulting punitive of reward measures 
might range from being excluded from public 
posts to lower interest on loans. The town’s So-
cial Credit Management Office an example of 
the infrastructural change needed to implement 
the SCS, displays high scoring citizens like the 
heroes of the past in posters around town.
An article on the Social Credit Score claimed it 
to be an improvement for Chinese citizens’ 
rights as it offered precise controlled subjuga-
tion instead of broadband repression e. g. in-
stead of prohibiting all travel to Beijing during 
“sensitive” times like the National Congress of 
the CP only those with low credit scores might 
not be able to purchase tickets. Articles of that 
kind downplay the impact the system will have 
claiming that the SCS does not force people 
into self-censorship and compliance. The inter-
linkage of the system into every aspect of one’s 
life however does make participation in this 
point game the only logical choice.
The role the SCS will play for civil society organ-
izations is another unknown. Civil society be-
comes active where the state is not fulfilling the 
needs of citizens. This might include pointing 
out system failures or unpunished trespasses 
against people, how are they to act according to 
their nature when demonstrating might become 
an action scored negatively. Even membership 
in an organization might make people vulnera-
ble to lowered scores and their consequences 
should the organization become the target of 
punitive measures due to its behavior.
While companies might argue against the SCS 
complaining about the necessity of private data 
to be able to compete, this line of argumenta-
tion is impossible to use for individuals, if you 
have nothing to hide why protest transparency 
and innovation for the betterment of the Chi-
nese people? This marks the social aspect of 
the Social Credit Score as the truly inescapable 
one even though China has made many ad-
vances in privacy rights. Adding the gamifica-
tion principle of scoring high and being re-
warded for doing good it is not surprising that 
very little is said in opposition.
Consequences,  
idiosyncrasies and conclusions
There are many unknown factors to the scope 
the Social Credit System might take on. There-
fore, the possible consequences and many of 
the idiosyncrasies in the current analysis of the 
SCS are subject to change and speculation:
Longevity of punitive measures – Different tar-
get groups are monitored by different scoring 
systems. Once a citizen is on a list of the drug 
user Social Credit Score system, or the journal-
ist Social Credit Score system, these scores will 
always appear when the person is being 
checked for “trustworthiness” no matter how 
long ago or unconnected the information is.
Data reliability  – Researchers have always en-
countered the problem of finding independent, 
reliable data in China. Whether it be air pollution 
monitoring, unemployment rates or crime scores. 
Independent monitoring or reporting on topics 
the government issues “sensitive” is a punishable 
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offense. The infrastructure to ensure the reliabil-
ity of the data the Social Credit Score is based 
upon does not exist yet and is as much of a tech-
nological hurdle as it is a systemic one. Directly 
interwoven with this aspect is the judiciary prob-
lem. While the system is supposed to help develop 
a better judiciary system, one might ask how peo-
ple are to deal with false and inaccurate scoring? 
And how is any accused to be treated equally in 
the eyes of the judge if the scores already judge 
them ahead of any evidence?
Transparency – Which government agency, which 
company collects what information and which 
platforms are used to share the data. Who is 
granted how much access to personal informa-
tion? Western citizens complain about being 
made out of glass in these digital times, while 
systems like the SCS are mostly impenetrable 
due to national information security. The German 
author Marc-Uwe Klinge wrote a book based on 
the premise that an algorithm fed with enough 
data can pick out your order and have it deliv-
ered to you before you are even aware of the 
wish for the product yourself. The protagonist in 
his book: Qualityland starts a journey that ends 
up being the hopeless search for the factors used 
by the algorithm and its’ structure that led to a 
product being delivered to him which he has no 
use for. There are many parallels to the develop-
ment of the Social Credit Score in China. The 
system’s goal is to promote transparency and 
trust in a convenient, automated manner, how-
ever the people are not trusted with the knowl-
edge of its inner workings.
Reach and Access  – The aspect most often 
taken to extremes in media reporting on the 
SCS is the interconnectedness with which the 
Chinese government is supposedly planning 
to handle the data provided. Already it is 
known that the Supreme Court shares the 
names of people having been judged on finan-
cial fraud with private companies. The con-
nection between credit fraud and the ability 
to consume luxury products a logical step to 
take. But the university application office’s 
decision not to take on students whose par-
ents are blacklisted from credit loans could 
also be viewed as such. Making a high SCS 
score another hurdle in the hiring procedure 
could be as much a consequence of the system 
as companies not receiving candidates due to 
bad labor right scores. Equal rights and ac-
cess to economic and social benefits will be 
undermined deeply.
Standards and Internationality – The stand-
ards used for the judgement of companies, or-
ganization’s and people’s behavior alike are 
those dictated by the Chinese government. 
How many credit score points might Mercedes 
Benz have potentially lost for its’ use of the Da-
lai Lama phrase “Look at situations from all 
angles, and you will become more open”in its 
advertisement? International companies are 
forced to adopt the Chinese rhetoric in all 
things to be able to compete. We know of the 
necessity of global standards for peaceful coop-
eration and development. China has already 
shown that it is not willing to adhere to stand-
ards set by the UN or other global institutions 
in the case of the South China Sea dispute, 
however with the SCS it shows that imposing 
its own standards on the global community 
poses no problem to the country.
The list of possible consequences and the likely 
scope the Social Credit System with its rewards 
and punishments will take can be continued end-
lessly. So far only the pilot cities and a number 
of public backlistings along with the planning 
document are our only source of reference for 
hard data. Not unusual in the government’s con-
duct before implementation of new regulations 
is the use of insecurity to further its own agenda. 
As for example seen when the ONGO law was 
implemented in 2017. A lack of concrete knowl-
edge and necessary infrastructure did not stop 
that regulation from being implemented and it 
will most likely not pose a hurdle to the SCS.
There is a global trend of solving social prob-
lems with technological approaches. Stelly and 
Yang (2006) have shown that most of the Chi-
nese population already believes that economic 
and technological development will undo any 
damage wrought on the environment and there-
fore should take precedence in decision making 
processes. Extending such technocratic views 
into the social sector is not much of a stretch: 
technology to combat moral decay, to reassure 
you of a products quality, to enforce compliance 
with air pollution standards. The gamification 
aspect, making earning points as enjoyable as 
crushing candy, being employed in the promo-
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tion of the Social Credit System as it adheres to 
individuals might lead to the underestimation of 
it. But to every reward system there is a puni-
tive aspect that in the hands of an authoritarian 
government that is known for taking advantage 
of vague laws and in-transparent decision-mak-
ing processes turns the SCS into a dangerous 
tool.
It is important to notice that when we speak 
about the Social Credit System in China, we do 
not primarily speak of plans for a financial trust-
worthiness score but a more multi-facetted 
analysis of a person’s (or organization’s) con-
duct to numbers based on a number of unknown 
factors and algorithms that can be used to man-
age their behavior. And it is not a system that 
stops at China’s borders. International data col-
lection hubs and the inclusion of foreign compa-
nies and organizations into the Chinese Social 
Credit Score System are part of the future vi-
sion of the system’s development.
Owning big data today is like owning oil fields. 
Facebook, Payback Points, WeChat, Sesame 
Credits, we are putting our data out there, as 
long as we are willing to let go of our privacy 
rights for convenience sake or other advantages 
a form of the social credit score is likely to be 
looming above our heads like a Damocles sword. 
To paraphrase Hanna Arendt: it’s when we stop 
thinking, that we open the door for bad things 
(The Banality of Evil, 1968). Every time we hit 
“accept the terms and conditions” without read-
ing or altering the privacy settings in our jour-
ney through cyberspace, we hand out what is by 
right ours to be used and abused. The Social 
Credit Score System is eliminating the “o. k.” 
button online and in real life, harvesting infor-
mation on our behavior everywhere and feeding 
the results to the Chinese government to use at 
its discretion, thereby successfully implement-
ing a digital totalitarian state.
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